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Justice Story, the Supreme Court,
and the Obligation of Contract
Morgan . Dowd
The political structure of the United States in the early 19th century
found itself engaged in a struggle between the proponents of State legis-
lative supremacy, on the one hand, and those who favored a strong central
government on the other. Professor Dowd, in his article entitled Justice
Story, The Supreme Court, and the Obligation of Contract, places into this
historical setting the efforts and accomplishments of Supreme Court Jus-
tice Joseph Story in promoting the cause of nationalism. Story, as a
champion of private rights, fought diligently to develop, and then to pre-
serve, the concept of the inviolability of private contracts. The author de-
velops in detail Story's impact on the Marshall Court, and especially his
utilization of the contract clause of the Constitution to bypass State regu-
lation and hostile State court systems. The author concludes that while the
impact of Story's constitutional philosophy in the area of the contract
clause was significant, it has now fortunately slipped into constitutional
history and his concept of a public interest which aided a few has been dis-
carded for a theory which provides aid for many.
I. INIRODUCTION
K AW IS AN EXPRESSION of the interests of a given group
4 or groups of a society during any specific period.' In the
early 19th century there were at least three objectives of the law
as interpreted by the courts: to bring order to the various social
relationships within the exist-
ing society, to protect the indi-
THE AuTHOR: MORGAN D. DOWD vidual's vested rights (that is,
(B.A., St. Michael's College; LLB., Cath-
olic University; M.A. and Ph. D., Univer- his private property), and to
sity of Massachusetts) is an Associate watch over the rights of the
Professor of Political Science at the State community as a whole. Er-
University of New York, College at
Fredonia. phasis on civil liberties as we
know them today was in gen-
eral lacking, since the individ-
ual needed to be protected more from others in the society than
from personal attack by the federal or State government. The
prevalent idea of law in this early setting was Euclidian in nature:
within limitations, it was an absolute and deductive science. Of
more importance, it was truly expressive of the interests of the group
or groups in power. Thus, when John Marshall announced in
Fletcher v. Peck2 that whenever property rights vested they could
1 J. HuRsT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAw 12 (1950).
2 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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not be displaced by legislative fiat, he was espousing a purely logi-
cal but highly artificial interpretation of the constitutional system.
And so it was with the myriad decisions rendered by the Supreme
Court in this formative period of American law.3
The mystique of the obligation of contract had its genesis in
the economic conditions preceding the construction of the Constitu-
tion. The States had been notoriously incapable of regulating com-
merce, and hence they had developed a laxity toward enforcing
public contracts Congress could make contracts with the States
but the latter could with impunity fail to execute them. When the
nation passed into a series of economic crises after 1783, the States,
not having any common regulations of commerce, were unable to
control the various inflationary spirals. Debtors in turn were able
to persuade State legislatures to cancel existing debts. Thus, State
legislatures were frequently goaded into passing emergency legisla-
tion at the expense of the creditor class. Suspension of debtors'
contracts became a commonplace occurrence.5
The complexion of early politics took on a dual aspect partly as
a result of this dichotomy between the debtor and the creditor.
Those who favored a strong central government which would regu-
late interstate (and in some instances intrastate) commerce became
known as nationalists. Those who were opposed to a vast national
government reasoned that the nation's economic ills could best be
cured through a decentralized system largely on a State-by-State
basis. The latter earned the sobriquet of States-righters. The for-
mer were champions of the theory of natural rights, while the latter
were proponents of State legislative supremacy.'
With the development of the national court system in 1789, a
large corpus of law was steadily developed by federal judges who
defended private property and helped promote the growth of national
law and corporations. The States fought a rearguard action with
the Supreme Court by attempting to stem the growth of an ever-
3 See generally F. CAHILL, JUDICIAL LEGISLATION, A STUDY IN AMERICAN LE-
GAL THEORY (1952); R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAw (1938);
R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw (1921).
4 "From the Nation's beginning, the States had lax notions as to the sacredness of
public contracts, and often violated the obligations of them." III A. BEVERIDGE, THE
LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 557 (1919). See also S. LnPSET, THE FIRST NEW NA-
TION (1963); J. STORY, Life, Character, and Services of Chief Justice Marshall, in
THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 653-56 (W. Story ed. 1852).
5 See A. MASON & W. BEANEY, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE SOCIETY 194
(1959).
6 Cf. J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT, ITS POLITICS, PERSONALITIES,
AND PROCEDURES 71 (1960).
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broadening national judiciary. Together, John Marshall and Jo-
seph Story laid the groundwork for eventual federal usurpation of
interstate commerce through a series of decisions involving the doc-
trine of vested rights. They were highly successful in one aspect:
the development of the obligation of contract theories.'
Story and Marshall adopted a public interest concept of the
contract. Basing their ideas in part on a strained interpretation of
the English common law, they were able to utilize the contract
clause to bypass "state regulation . . . [and] hostile state court
systems."8  The Constitution did not treat a contract in any great
detail. At common law 'both unilateral contracts (in which the
parties agreed that one should perform and the other pay for the
services) and bilateral contracts (in which both sides made mutual
promises to perform for a sufficient consideration) were recognized.
The courts had also accepted that part of the common law dealing
with executory contracts (contracts with specific conditions to be ful-
filled) and executed contracts (where the conditions had been met).
But on questions of public policy involving the State and individu-
als or the private rights of individuals versus municipalities, the
law was relatively undeveloped.
John Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck' started in motion a series of
decisions which promoted national judicial regulation of the con-
tract clause. When he declared that the revocation of land grants
was unconstitutional since it involved the sanctity of a -contract he
was echoing Alexander Hamilton's sentiments that such action 'by
State legislatures was contrary to the "first principles of national
justice and social policy."'" The case stretched the contract clause to
include public grants as within the purview of the Constitution.
In New Jersey v. Wilson" (1812), Marshall declared that a con-
tract which had been made between the colony of New Jersey and
the Delaware Indians exempting lands from taxation was enforce-
7 See JOSEPH STORY 120-52 (M. Schwartz & J. Hogan eds. 1959).
8 J. ScHMIHAUSER, supra note 6, at 71-72.
910 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). See generally H. COMMAGER, JOSEPH STORY:
GASPER BACON IECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1953);
Dowd, Justice Joseph Story: A Study of the Legal Philosophy of a Jeffersonian Judge,
18 VAND. L 11Ev. 643 (1965); Dunne, Joseph Story: The Great Term, 79 HARV. L
REV. 877 (1966); Dunne, Joseph Story: The Middle Years, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1679
(1967).
10 J. SCHMDHAUSER, supra note 6, at 71. For a general discussion of the contract
clause in constitutional law, see B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CON-
sTITUToN (1938).
1111 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812).
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able. The question remained, however, whether corporate charters
as well as public grants were protected by article I, section 10, of the
Constitution. Seven years elapsed before the Court was again to
be heard on the contract clause and vested rights. The Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward"2 case, decided in 1819, in accord
with the philosophies of Marshall and Story, emerged as a cause
c~l~bre in American constitutional law.
II. TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
V. WOODWARD
A. The Setting of the Dartmouth College Case
In 1816 the Republican Party of New Hampshire made a com-
plete sweep of the State elections, an event which ushered in a
period of unusual legislative activity.' Reform of various institu-
tions, including Dartmouth College, was in the minds of numerous
public officials. Newly elected Governor William Plumer set the
stage for change in his inaugural address when he announced that
the college was a State concern and thus should be subject to State
regulation. For a longer period than most men could recall, he
added, the State had contributed funds to aid the development of
the school. Now the time had arrived for the State to exercise its
legal authority over public institutions. Furthermore, the original
Royal Charter contained certain sections which he felt were "hos-
tile to the spirit and genius of a free government."' 4  These limita-
tions included the power of the trustees to appoint their own suc-
cessors and to nominate or dismiss the president of the college at
their whim, thus frustrating any possibility of State control.' 5 In
considering the college to be a public institution, he suggested that
12 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
l3The following background material has proved helpful in placing the Dart-
mouth case in its historical context: Denham, An Historical Development of the Con-
tract Theory in The Dartmouth College Case, 7 MICH. L. REv. 201 (1909); Fairnaan,
The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Limitations on State Governmental Author-
ity, 21 U. Cin. L. REV. 40 (1953); Hall, The Dartmouth College Case, 20 GREEN
BAG 244 (1908); Harris, Judicial Review in the United States of America, 56 DICK.
L. REV. 177 (1952); Hogan, The Dartmouth College Case, 19 GEO. L.J. 411 (1931);
Jenkins, Should the Dartmouth College Decision Be Recalled?, 51 AM. L. REv. 711
(1917).
14 L. TURNBR, WILLIAM PLUMER oF NEw HAMPSHm 1789-1850, at 246
(1962).
15John Wheelock had recently been replaced as president by the trustees. Id. at
JUSTICE STORY
the legislature take the necessary steps to remedy the existing cor-
porate charter."0
In June, and again in December 1816, the New Hampshire
Legislature passed separate acts calling for a general reorganization
of Dartmouth College. The legislation called for plans to revamp
the charter by increasing the number of trustees to 21, changing
the name to Dartmouth University, and creating a Board of Over-
seers to act as a watchdog agency over the trustees.
B. The Dartmouth Case it the State Courts
The old guard Federalist trustees refused to recognize the acts
and brought an action in trover to recover the books of record, origi-
nal charter, corporate seal, and other materials which were in the pos-
session of the new trustees and the recently reinstated treasurer
William Woodward."' Suit was instituted during the February
1817 term in the court of common pleas and the case was moved
to the superior court of judicature in May.' The cause was ar-
gued for the college by the well-known lawyers Jeremiah Mason
and Jeremiah Smith." The defendant's case was handled by the
attorney general of New Hampshire. The court requested that a
reargument be heard, and this time the defense added Ichabod
Bartlett while the plaintiff engaged the young, up-and-coming
attorney Daniel Webster.
The New Hampshire Superior Court consisted of William Rich-
ardson (Chief Justice), Samuel Bell, and Levi Woodbury. Chief
Justice Richardson wrote the unanimous decision upholding the
laws of the State. The opinion was well reasoned and fairly well
destroyed die plaintiff's legal arguments that the legislature had no
constitutional right "to authorize the appointment of new trustees,
without the consent of the corporation.""0  Chief Justice Richard-
son distinguished private corporations from public corporations,
insisting that the former included such institutions as banks, insur-
ance companies, and manufacturing concerns while the latter con-
sisted of counties, towns, parishes, and the like. A private corpora-
tion, he thought, was responsible only for its members and was
Old. at 240-58.
17 1 C. HAINES, TRE ROLE OF THE SuIREM COURT iN AMERICAN GovERN-
MENT AND POLITICS 1789-1835, at 380-82 (2d ed. 1960).
18 IV A. BEVERIDMG, supra note 4, at 233-34.
19 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 65 N.H. 473 (1817), rev'd, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819).
201do at 626.
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subject only to a general regulation on the part of the State; public
corporations, however, were created for public purposes and were
built on public trust. He dismissed the issue as to whether or not
Dartmouth College was a public or a private corporation by insist-
ing that "it does not appear that [the college] was subject to any
private visitation whatever."'" Moreover, he found that the objects
of the charter had always been of public concern, thus voiding any
private tangible interests which the original trustees might claim.
In this way he was able to avoid the question of legislative inter-
ference with a private corporation.
The college had not presented a very imaginative argument.
One minor point was raised, however, which Judge Richardson ex-
amined at some length. Article I, section 10 of the Federal Con-
stitution stated that no State shall impair the obligation of contract.
The judge pointed out that no case had been decided by either a
federal or State court where a charter was considered to be a common
law contract. While he respected the original purpose of the
clause - to protect private rights of property - he believed that
it must be interpreted "in its common and ordinary acceptation, as
an actual agreement between parties"2 and not merely as a legal
fiction. He emphatically stated:
[The clause was] not intended to limit the power of the states,
in relation to their own publick officers and servants, or to their
own civil institutions, and must not be construed to embrace con-
tracts, which are in their nature, mere matters of civil institution;
nor grants of power and authority, by a state to individuals, to be
exercised for purposes merely publick.2"
There were certain well-recognized and legitimate interferences
on the part of the State vis-4-vis the private rights of individuals
which were considered essential to maintaining harmony in the
body politic, and no one had ever declared these acts to be an im-
pairment of contract and contrary to public policy. Judge Richard-
son cited such examples as the marriage contract countermanded
by a divorce decree, contracts with conditions precedent leading
to forfeiture of rights and remedies, the enlarging and decreasing
of territorial limits of a town, and the imposition of new duties or
the limitation of certain powers and privileges on the citizens in a
State.
211 d. at 629.
221d. at 639.
23 Id. at 639-40.
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Richardson concluded his opinion by restating the issues of the
case. Schools which operate on State funds are public corpora-
tions; to construe them to be otherwise would admit that the State
has no powers with respect to public institutions. If he ruled in
any other manner he felt he would permit all public bodies to be
placed beyond legislative control. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that the charter could be construed as a contract, he main-
tained that no government could long exist which allowed con-
tractual relationships to become absolute and free from legislative
interference for an unspecified period of time. He closed with a
very prophetic remark. Institutions should operate in the public
interest and not merely for the few. It was a statement that re-
flected the opinion of the majority of the New Hampshire citizenry
and was typical of the sentiments that heralded the era of Jacksonian
democracy.24
C. Tbe Appeal of Dartmouth College to the Supreme Court
The college and its counsel did not take the defeat lightly. In-
deed, they had anticipated an adverse decision before it was actually
rendered, and as a result were busily engaged in preparing the case
for the United States Supreme Court. It was felt that a more
sympathetic ear would be given to their cause in Washington.
Daniel Webster was the moving force behind the appeal. His ac-
tivity did not center around the technicalities of the suit; he left the
legal research up to his trusted friends and cocounsel, Mason and
Smith." Nevertheless, he was the political mainspring and con-
24 The Chief Justice ably reflected the feeling of the people when he said:
I am aware that this power in the hands of the legislature may, like every
other power, at times be unwisely exercised; but where can it be more securely
lodged? If those, whom the people annually elect to manage their publick
affairs, cannot be trusted, who can? The people have most emphatically
enjoined it in the constitution, as a duty upon the legislators and magistrates,
in all future periods of the government, to cherish the interests of literature
and the sciences and all seminaries and publick schools. And those inter-
ests will be cherished, both by the legislature and the people so long as there
is virtue enough left to maintain the rest of our institutions. Whenever the
people and their rulers shall become corrupt enough to wage war with the
sciences and liberal arts, we may be assured that the time will have arrived,
when all our institutions, our laws, our liberties must pass away, - when
all that can be dear to freedom, or that can make their country dear to them,
must be lost, and when a government and institutions must be established, of
a very different character from those under which it is our pride and happi-
ness to live. Id. at 643.
2 5 Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason, Nov. 27, 1817, in 1 THE PRI-
VATE CORRESPONDENCE OF DANEL WEBSTER 266 (F. Webster ed. 1857) [here-
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stitutionalist for the college. He was aware of the limitations of
the college's cause - that it was being appealed on the narrow
question of a public versus private contract - and he therefore
suggested that several fictitious cases of ejectment26 be brought in
Vermont federal court in order to give a wider basis of jurisdiction
and to raise all the possible constitutional issues.2"
The first indication of possible collusion between Webster and
Justice Story, a member of the Supreme Court, in the Dartmouth
case can be traced to a letter from Webster to Mason dated early
in January 1818. He wrote: "I saw Judge Story as he went on.
He said he had had a correspondence with you about 'things'; but
company being present, did not say what things."2  Again on
February 22, Webster referred to Story's involvement with the af-
fair without indicating what his actual role was. "The judge volun-
teered to tell me what correspondence had taken place, and he
seems to be fixed in his purpose in that particular."2
In the meantime both sides were preparing their briefs soon to
be argued before the Supreme Court. Daniel Webster, aided by
the able Joseph Hopkinson, represented the college. Their oppon-
ents were William Wirt and John Holmes. The former had been
Attorney General of the United States and a man whom his
friends referred to as "a ripe and splendid orator.""° The oral argu-
ments made before the Court closely paralleled those of the original
suit, with perhaps more emphasis on the contract clause than in
the lower court.3 When the argument was finished in mid-March,
Chief Justice Marshall announced that the question was so impor-
tant that the Court, in all likelihood, would not render a decision
in the 1818 term. The real reason, however, was that the Court
was badly divided. Webster believed that Marshall, Washington,
inafter cited as PRIVATE CoRREsPoNDENCE]; Letter from Daniel Webster to C.J.
Smith, Dec. 8, 1817, in id. at 268.
26 Ejectment would be used to oust the new trustees from control of college land
located in Vermont.
27 Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason, Dec. 8, 1817, in LETTERS OF
DANIEL WEBSTER 74-75 (C. Van Tyne ed. 1902) [hereinafter cited as LETTERS].
28 Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason, Jan. 1818, in I PRIVATE COR-
RESPONDENCE, supra note 25, at 270.
29 Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason, Feb. 22, 1818, in id.
30 1 S. BROWN, THE WORKS OF RUFUS CHOATE 515 (1862).
31 See Letter from Daniel Webster to Reverend Francis Brown, March 11, 1818,
in 16 WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 40 (nat'l ed. 1903) [herein-
after cited as WRITINGS]; Letter from Daniel Webster to Reverend Francis Brown,
March 13, 1818, in 1 PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 25, at 275.
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and Story favored the college; Duval and Todd were opposed; and
Livingston and Johnson were undecided.32
Now, with the Dartmouth College case argued, both camps
retired to evaluate their respective positions. The State of New
Hampshire had made a poor showing. Attorney Holmes had
apologized to the Court that "he had not had time to study the
case." 33  By not ruling against the State, the Supreme Court cre-
ated a false impression that they might support the university. But
members of the bench who favored the college were pleased at the
stay, for they believed that the opportunity was at hand to con-
vince a workable majority to restrain the New Hampshire Legisla-
ture.34  Of equal significance was a series of cognate cases which
were being prepared for the circuit court at Portsmouth - Judge
Story's legal bailiwick. Webster spoke several times with Story
during the months of March and April and he was quite convinced
that Story not only supported his cause but was willing to go to
considerable lengths to uphold his case.35 The Judge advised him
that the fictitious diversity cases should be readied as soon as pos-
sible, and that he would personally call a special session if necessary
to have the cases heard. He also indicated that he would not give
an opinion in the district court. Instead he would send the cases
directly on to Washington, pro forma."6 The question of Story's
participation in the case no longer rested on idle speculation. Story
told Webster he wanted a case "which shall present all the ques-
tions"3" and one which would allow the Court to give a sweeping
opinion. John Shirley remarked that Story wanted to give a broad
decision on the violation of the natural rights of the obligation of
contract, thus ending legislative interference in private vested
rights forever.8
32 See Letter from Daniel Webster to William Sullivan, March 13, 1818, in 16
WRrnNGs, supra note 31, at 41; Letter from Daniel Webster to C.J. Smith, March
14, 1818, in 1 PRIVATE CORRESPONDENcE, supra note 25, at 276.
33 1 S. BROWN, supra note 30, at 515.
34 Note the very able discussion in 1 C. H{AiNES, supra note 17, at 394-98.
35 See Letter from Daniel Webster to Francis Brown, March 30, 1818, in 1 PRI-
VATE CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 25, at 279. In this letter, Webster stated: "I
doubt whether Judge Story will incline to give an opinion, and rather think he will
prefer that the case should go directly to Washington. In this particular, however,
he must take his own course." Id. See also Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah
Mason, April 23, 1818, in id. at 281.
36Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason, April 23, 1818, in id.
37 Id.
38 See J. SHIRLEY, DARThOUTH COLLEGE CAUSES AND THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 277 (1879).
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Throughout the summer and fall Webster communicated with
Story. Many of Story's letters have disappeared, presumably de-
stroyed on purpose by Webster."9 But the letters of Webster have
been preserved and they reveal how he was coached by the Judge.
On the 9th of September 1818, Webster sent Story copies of the
briefs used in the several cognate cases instituted May 1.
I send you five copies of our argument. If you send one of them
to each of such of the judges as you think proper, you will of
course do it in the manner least likely to lead to a feeling that any
indecorum has been committed by the plaintiffs. The truth is, the
New Hampshire opinion is able, ingenious, and plausible. It has
been widely circulated, and something was necessary to exhibit the
other side of the question.40
And to cover every possible angle, Webster, at some considerable
personal expense, had sent to England for certain works on the
common law (Duke on Charitable Uses; Highmore on Mortmain)
which were not available in the States. "These books," he told
Francis Brown, "are now lent to Judge Storey [sic]."'"
How did Story consider his position? Doubtless he did not
want it to appear that he favored one side over the other. There-
fore, he heard the various subsidiary law suits in October, allowed
defense counsel Ichabod Bartlett to state new facts not found in
the original action, but refused to enter an opinion. Story, never-
theless, allowed a direct appeal, on a writ of error, to the Supreme
Court.42 When Governor Plumer tried to make Judge Story's
position uncomfortable by appointing him to the Board of Over-
seers at Dartmouth University, he refused outright.4" On the other
hand, he encouraged Justice William Johnson to visit New York's
famed jurist James Kent, knowing full well that Kent would try
to convince Johnson to go along with Marshall, Washington, and
himself. Finally, he drew up his opinion for the Dartmouth case
39 See Letter from Daniel Webster to Joseph Story, Aug. 16, 1818, in 1 PRIVATE
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 25, at 286. "According to your wish, I send you a
copy of such memoranda of cases, &c., as I have met with, relative to the college ques-
tion. They are of small importance." Id.
40 Letter from Daniel Webster to Joseph Story, Sept. 9, 1818, in id. at 287.
41 Letter from Daniel Webster to Francis Brown, Dec. 27, 1818, in Dartmouth
College Library, MS. 818,511.
42 See Letter from Daniel Webster to Joseph Story, June 29, 1818, in Massachu-
setts Historical Society, Story MS. 51; Letter from William Allen to William Pinkney,
Sept. 10, 1818, in Dartmouth College Library, MS. 818,510.1; Letter from Jeremiah
Mason to Charles Marsh, Sept. 11, 1818, in id., MS. 818,511; Letter from William
Allen to Selma Hale, Dec. 6, 1818, in id., MS. 818,656.
43 J. SmRLEY, supra note 38, at 270-75.
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even before the 1819 term began, and circulated it freely to several
influential judges and lawyers, as well as to the justices of the
Court. So persuasive was this tactic that it apparently won over
Brockholst Livingston, one of the two original dissenters:
I return your opinion in the case of Dartmouth College, which
has afforded me more pleasure than can easily be expressed. It
was exactly what I had expected from you, and hope it will be
adopted without alteration. What you say of the contract of mar-
riage, is a complete answer to the difficulty made on that sub-ject, and I am not sorry that you have taken notice of the Legis-
lature dissolving this contract, which has been passed in this State.
As to the effect of the separation of the two countries on the
charter of this College, in addition to what you say, it appears to
me that its existence is admitted by the very acts which are com-
plained of.45
D. The Dartmouth College Opinion in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court convened on the morning of February 2,
1819 to deliver an opinion in the Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward" case. William Pinkney, the famed Baltimore law-
yer, diplomat, and man of letters, had replaced Ichabod Bartlett for
the State of New Hampshire. Fully expecting that he would be
able to reargue the case, Pinkney waited politely until the Justices
were seated. As he rose to address the Court, John Marshall be-
gan to read his opinion in a sonorous monotone. Marshall obvi-
ously was aware that Pinkney was seeking the Court's attention, but
ignored him, as did the rest of the bench4 And this was done
for a definite purpose. Marshall, with Story's help, had mustered
a near unanimous decision and they were not about to retreat.
Five of the judges present were with the majority: Marshall, Wash-
ington, Livingston, Johnson, and Story. The lone dissenter was
Gabriel Duval; he chose not to write an opinion. Justice Todd
was absent. In Webster's words the decision "goes the whole
length - & leaves not an inch for the University."4
The best oral argument that the State of New Hampshire could
make was that the federal government's control over the States
did not extend to its internal affairs; that questions of State gov-
4 4 Letter from William Prescott to Joseph Story,'Jan. 9, 1819, in 1 LIFE AND LET-
TEaS OF JOSEPH STORY 324 (W. Story ed. 1851) [hereinafter cited as STORY].
4 5 etter from Brockholst Livingston to Joseph Story, Jan. 24, 1819, in id.
46 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
47 1 C. HAINEs, supra note 17, at 402.
48 etter from Daniel Webster to Ezekiel Webster, Feb. 2, 1819, in Dartmouth
College Library, MS. 819,152.7.
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eminent, education, or private contractual arrangements were pro-
tected by the State's police powers and, hence, barred federal in-
tervention. 9 The college, on the other hand, argued to exclude
State control of the educational process. As Joseph IHopkinson
told the Court, if the States were upheld it would prove "that pro-
fessors, masters, preceptors, and tutors, are all political persons
and public officers; and that all education is necessarily and ex-
clusively the business of the state."5  Interestingly enough, both
parties to the litigation presented a case for limited federal activ-
ity; the former excluded federal participation while the latter de-
sired only that the rights of private property be protected. Nei-
ther advocated federal regulation of the educational process.
Turning, however, to Marshall's decision, we find that he ig-
nored in part the pleas of counsel in arriving at his conclusion
that "education is an object of national concern, and [thel proper
subject of legislation"'" - a proposition which all would admit.
Thus, at the start, he placed the case on a national footing and
structured the decision as a definitive answer to the States.
Marshall's analysis of the Dartmouth College controversy can
be broken down into two questions. Was the contract protected
by the Federal Constitution? And if so, was the contract impaired
by the State legislative acts? This was subtle sophistry, for it dis-
missed the issue whether a contract existed in fact. How did Mar-
shall justify this line of thought? "It can require no argument," he
wrote, "to prove that the circumstances of this case constitute a con-
tract.'' M This was extremely fallacious legal reasoning for it did
not contain a single element of proof from either the common law
or statutory law. It was a mere logical deduction from a faulty prem-
ise; nonetheless, it formed the basis of his decision.53
The Chief Justice then related the charter to a contract; con-
tracts which are mentioned in the Constitution pertain only to
those dealing with private property and "confer rights which may
be asserted in a court of justice."5  Charters contain rights; there-
49 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 600.
50 Id. at 616.
51 Id. at 634.
52 Id. at 627; see W. HUNTING, THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS CLAUSE OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1919); Isaacs, John Marshall on Contracts. A
Study in Early American Juristic Theory, 7 VA. L. REV. 413 (1921).
53 See Mendelson, John Marshall's Short Way with Statutes; a Study in the Ju-
dicial Use of Legislation To Expound the Constitution, 15 KY. L.J. 284 (1948); Stin-
son, Marshall and the Supremacy of the Unwritten Law, 58 ANL L. REv. 856 (1924).
54 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 629.
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fore, the Constitution recognizes a charter as a contract and it pro-
tects it as private property. As to the claim that there was a dis-
tinction between private and public corporations, Marshall could
find nothing public in the case. The source of the funds to run
the school was private (an outright distortion of the facts, since
the school had been founded on a State lottery); the application of
the funds used at the school was private (only partly correct); and
the acts of incorporation were private (true only if the British colo-
nial government was recognized as being legitimate at the time
the State acts were passed).55 Stretching the case to cover every
possible loophole, Marshall concluded that while it was true that
Parliament had certain powers to annul corporate rights (quo war-
ranto proceedings), still in the final analysis a valid contract con-
tinued in existence. He affirmed this principle even though the
original donors no longer had any actual interest in the property.
The state acts were declared to be unconstitutional as violating
the contract clause of the Constitution." It was a solipsism that
defied explanation."
Justice Story approached the case on a different level. Not
only was his opinion sweeping in respect to its coverage of common
law corporations, but it related the contract clause to the doctrine
of vested rights. Furthermore, he provided a legal basis (albeit
the question remains how correct it was) for the decision which
was totally absent in Marshall's tour de force.
Story accepted Marshall's two questions on the status of the
charter and the impairment of contract as being pertinent to the
discussion. He examined at great length the "nature, rights, and
duties of aggregate corporations at common law."58  At the outset
he distinguished public corporations from private institutions. In
this respect he had some difficulty explaining how private trustees
could accept public charity and yet remain immune from State con-
trol. The college was a private institution, he declared, because
the act of incorporation made it so. But in making this allegation
he realized the shortcomings of such a line of reasoning; it was in
direct conflict with English precedent. For instance, observe how
he stumbled along in trying to justify the status of the institution:
551d. at 635-38.
56ld. at 654.
57 For a general discussion see E. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTI-
TuTXoN (1919) and J. Osms, THB PoLrcA. AND EcONONEC DOcnIUNES OF JOHN
MARSHALL (1914).
5S 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 667 (concurring opinion).
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The charity, then, may, in this sense, be public, although it may
be administered by private trustees; and, for the same reason, it
may thus be public, though administered by a private corporation.
The fact, then, that the charity is public, affords no proof that the
corporation is also public; and, consequently, the argument, so far
as it is built on this foundation, falls to the ground.59
Not being totally satisfied with his argument, he added to his
already circumlocutious opinion "that because the charity is pub-
lic, the corporation is public... manifestly confounds the popular,
with the strictly legal sense of the terms."'  But was it not Story
who was confounding the issues? His fear that every hospital and
college would come under the State's authority and be a public cor-
poration was justified. England was already on the march toward
establishing charitable public institutions. Story chose to ignore
such progress since it was anathema to his public philosophy. He
believed that the function of a State legislature was a limited one.
It was not to determine the rights of public versus private corporate
bodies: the judicial branch assumed that responsibility. Instead leg-
islators should exercise a visitorial power to "correct all irregulari-
ties and abuses in such corporations, and to compel the original
purposes of the charity to be faithfully fulfilled."'" It was essen-
tially the reverse in England, however, where the courts were being
forced to follow, rather than lead, Parliament on matters of public
policy.
Having established that the college was a private eleemosynary
institution, Story discussed at some length the charter as a contract.
Counsel for the State had denied that a charter could be a con-
tract for lack of sufficient consideration. Story disagreed with this
interpretation of the common law. The situation was something
more than an executory contract; it was an irrevocable gift cou-
pled with implied agreements on the part of Dr. Wheelock,
founder of the school.
It has never been doubted, that an agreement not to exercise a
trade in a particular place was a sufficient consideration to sus-
tain a contract for the payment of money. A fortiori, the relin-
quishment of property which a person holds, or controls the use of,
as a trust, is a sufficient consideration; for it is parting with a
legal right.62
This was a most perplexing statement of the English law of
59Id. at 671.
60 Id.
O1 Id. at 673.
62Id. at 687.
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contracts. In truth he was referring to the terms of a trust, which
would be valid only during the life of the trustees. A corporation
had been created by the Crown with the avowed purpose of dis-
tributing in perpetuity charitable donations from private and pub-
lic sources. Thus, in each succeeding generation, a valuable con-
sideration would be deemed to exist between the founder, the trus-
tees, and the benefactors although no legal consideration passed
to validate the agreement. It was a form of contract in perpetuity
- a legal anachronism - and one which never existed in English
common law.
63
The attorneys for the State of New Hampshire had made an
interesting point in their oral argument. There were, they said,
certain classes of contracts over which the Supreme Court did not
exercise review; marriage contracts constituted such a class. 4 Then
they related marriage to the case at bar, arguing that such matters
were domestic and purely within the province of the State. Mar-
shall agreed that the legislature was limited only where property
rights were involved. In this case, however, he believed that a
charter was a contract with tangible property rights. Story, on the
other hand, accepted this statement of the law as accurate but
held some reservations. Laws regulating divorces, remedies in
breach of marriage contracts, and forfeitures of rights in marriage
agreements did not impair contractual obligations. If, however,
the legislature invested itself with the power to dissolve a contract
without recognizing a breach on either side and did so against the
wish of the parties and without any form of judicial review, the
case was quite different. "I certainly am not prepared to admit
such a power," he wrote, "or that its exercise would not entrench
upon the prohibition of the constitution." Story was determined
to give as little authority to State legislatures over vested rights as
was humanly possible.
The touchstone of Story's decision in the Dartmouth College
controversy lay, however, not in his review of corporations, charters,
or contracts, but solely on the question which Marshall chose to
63 John C. Hogan has edited much of Story's writings on the common law. See,
e.g., Hogan, Joseph Story on Capital Punishment, 43 CAM1n. L REV. 76-84 (1955);
Hogan, Joseph Story's Encyclopedia Americana 'Law Articles', 48 LAW LIBRARY J.
117 (1955); Hogan, Joseph Story's Essay on 'Natural Law', 34 ORE. L. REV. 88 (1955);
Hogan, Joseph Story on the Law of Contract, 12 RuTGERs L REv. 366 (1957); Hogan,
Three Essays on the Law, 28 S. CAr.. L REV. 19 (1954); Hogan, Justice Story on the
Commoo Law of Evidence, 9 VAND. L REV. 51 (1955).
64 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 600 (concurring opinion).
651d. at 696.
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evade. Was the charter dissolved at the time of the Revolution
and thus reduced to a mere nullity in 1819?6 If this were the
case then the majority decision rested on shifting sand. What jus-
tification could be made if it were decided that the charter's con-
tractual obligations were terminated in 1775? Story answered this
query by reviving a common law decision of Lord Thurlow and by
positing the ratio of that case. He believed it was a principle of
the common law, as well as of international law, that when an em-
pire was divided it did not foreclose rights in property already
vested. Such a maxim he found was consonant with "the common
sense of mankind, and the maxims of eternal justice." 7
But this was not an accurate description of the political situa-
tion in New Hampshire during the 1775-83 period. A full-fledged
revolution had been carried out; the British colonial government
had been displaced; and previously vested foreign rights disappeared
with the emergence of the new federal and State governments.
State legislatures had even confiscated the property of numerous
wealthy Tories and this was accomplished by strictly legal proce-
dures. The rights of individuals having an interest in foreign cor-
porations during a revolution or war have always hung in the bal-
ance by a delicate thread.68 Nineteenth century international law
recognized the right of a revolutionary government to cancel exist-
ing contractual obligations if either reparation or arbitration set-
tlements were made when the country became more stable. Hence,
the Jay Treaty provided the arbitration machinery in settling con-
fiscated British estates. But in the Dartmouth case it was argued
that the corporation had "acquired rights" from the Crown which
could not be divested. This was neither true in fact nor in theory.69
By positing the doctrine of "acquired rights" Story provided a
twisted interpretation of municipal and foreign conflict of laws."
His decision had the effect of forcing the central Government to
provide absolute protection for private corporations while it excluded
State legislative control. In other words, it tended to federalize all
British-owned corporations created before the war, even though
66 For a thorough discussion indicating that the charter was dissolved, see Jenkins,
Should the Dartmouth College Decision Be Recalled?, 51 AM. L. REV. 711 (1917).
67 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 707 (concurring opinion).
68 See W. GOULD, AN INTRODUcTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 507-33 (1957).
69Id. at 516-21.
70 For a general discussion, see Leslie, The Influence of Joseph Story's Theory of
the Conflict of Laws on Constitutional Nationalism, 35 MIss. VALLEY HISTORICAL
REv. 203 (1948).
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they had descended in the interim into American hands and were
recognized as American corporations. Fearful that property rights
would be disturbed by State legislators, Story dramatized the effects
of State regulatory legislation. It was an argument that the law-
yers for New Hampshire did not dwell upon but it probably would
have made little difference, since the Court was bent on maintain-
ing the status quo of all private property relationships.7
The Dartmouth decision was quite typical of the early Marshall
Court's pronouncements. Marshall and Story were in effect writ-
ing into the Constitution their own economic, political, and social
philosophies." Story went much further than John Marshall in
staking out the legitimate areas of State competency. Actually he
was upset that the case did not go far enough. "I always had a
desire that the question should be put upon the broad basis you
have stated," he told Jeremiah Mason 6 months after the case was
decided. He added that "it was matter of regret that we were so
stinted in jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, that half the argu-
ment could not be met and enforced." 3  There are two possible
interpretations of these remarks. First, they may have been made
in reference to the writ of error from the State Supreme Court of
New Hampshire limiting the case to the narrow issue of deciding
whether there was an impairment of the obligation of contract.
Second, they may have referred to Story's grand design to relate
the contract clause to a theory of natural law and thus place the
principles of constitutional government beyond the pale of legisla-
tive control. In this respect he was unable to definitively draw the
line between legitimate acts of State legislatures and those which he
71 Story had truly adopted the Federalist position on private property by 1819.
There is some question that several years prior to 1819 he had been a loyal Republi-
can friend of university officials. From the time of his elevation to the bench, how-
ever, his sentiments lay with the upper levels of New England society. For a keen
discussion on Story's early political sentiments, see 1 C HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE
StPRRM E COURT IN AMmIcAN GOVBRNMENT AND POLITICS, 1789-1835, at 411-15
(2d ed. 1960).
7 2 For some general discussions of the Justices' philosophies, as effecting their in-
terpretation of the Constitution, see E. BAUBR, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTru-
TION, 1790-1860 (1952); CHIEF JUSTnCE JOHN MARSHALL: A REAPPRAISAL (W.M.
Jones ed. 1956); Isaacs, John Marshall on Contracts. A Study in Early American Juris-
tic Theory, 7 VA. L. REV. 413 (1921); Mendelson, Sectional Politics and the Rise of
Judicial Supremacy, 9 J. POL. 255 (1947); Moses, The Friendship Between Marshall
and Story, 35 AM. L. REV. 321 (1901); Stinson, Marshall and the Supremacy of the
Unwritten Law, 58 AM. L. REV. 856 (1924).
7 3 Letter from Joseph Story to Jeremiah Mason, Oct. 6, 1819, in 1 STORY, supra
note 44, at 323.
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deemed to be unconstitutional and subversive to a well-ordered so-
ciety.
Did Marshall restrain Story in the writing of this opinion? Or
did Story exercise a certain control over the Chief Justice? With
respect to the first query, Marshall could have waited for the new
cases to come up, held a rehearing, and placed the decision upon a
much broader foundation. Instead he chose to limit the jurisdic-
tional question and declare the individual act of the State of New
Hampshire to be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. The
second point is an interesting one upon which, to speculate. In
May of 1819 John Marshall wrote to Story that he was "much
obliged by the alterations you have made in the opinion in the
Dartmouth College case, & am highly gratified by what you say
respecting it."74  Did this refer to Story's historical and philosophi-
cal treatment of English corporations - to his development of the
contract clause? Perhaps he had corrected MarshalFs interpretation
of the common law, as was so often the case in other decisions.
Or the situation may have been the obvious one in which Marshall
was grateful that Story had provided extensive documentation, thus
helping to solidify Marshall's constitutional law.
III. THE AFTERMATH OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
When Daniel Webster first learned of the Court's favorable
decision, he believed that victory for the friends of Dartmouth Col-
lege was complete.7 5 But Webster became more cautious when
William Pinkney indicated that he was going to argue the subsidiary
cases which Webster and Mason had instituted originally in the
lower federal court (and which Judge Story had so conveniently
forwarded to the Supreme Court).7 6 He warned Timothy Farrar
to prevent the New Hampshire Federalists from trumpeting too
loudly recent events. Moderation was the keynote. "We have
many friends," he explained to Farrar, "who feel the victory as their
own, and who would be grieved and mortified to see it abused." T
74 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story, May 27, 1819, in 14 MASS. HIS-
TORICAL SOc'Y PROCEEDINGS 324-25 (C. Smith comp. 2d serv. 1901) [hereinafter
cited as PROCEEDINGS].
7 5 See Letter from Daniel Webster to Ezekiel Webster, Feb. 2, 1819, in Dartmouth
College Library, MS. 819,152.7; Letter from Daniel Webster to Francis Brown, Feb. 2,
1819, in id., MS. 819,152.11; Letter from Daniel Webster to C.J. Smith, Feb. 2, 1819,
in 1 PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 25, at 299.
76 See Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason, Feb. 4, 1819, in 16 WRIT-
INGS, supra note 31, at 44.
77 Letter from Daniel Webster to Timothy Farrar, Feb. 9, 1819, in 29 NEw ENGLAND
GENEALOGICAL REGISTER 229-30 (A. Hoyt ed. 1875) [hereinafter cited as REGISTER].
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Widespread publication of the Court's opinions could lead to
hostile public reaction against both the college and the Court. No
one was more keenly aware of the dangers of this kind of reverse
publicity than Justice Story. Therefore, on a strictly informal basis,
Webster and Story must have mapped the steps to be taken rela-
tive to the cognate cases still pending before the Supreme Court.7
Webster petitioned the bench for a certificate to send the cases back
to the circuit court for disposition. 9 This action "would enable
Judge Story to know what to do with them in May."80 The Court
granted Webster's request and remanded the cases. This meant
that the university people would have to show cause in the lower
court (to produce new evidence) in order to merit a new trial. If
they failed to convince the circuit court judge (who was Joseph
Story), the decision would stand. Webster was quite certain how
events would proceed in Story's court.
The cause will be sent back without further discussion here. These
verdicts will be set aside, so far as to admit proof of other perti-
nent facts. They will then, if they please, offer proof of a par-
ticular fact. We shall object on the ground that that fact is not
material, or pertinent. The judge will decide this, and if they do
not like the decision, they will tender a bill of exceptions. Of all
the courses which offer themselves, this seems to be the most safe
and easy for us.81
In order to combat any resistance to the decision from Republi-
cans in New Hampshire, Webster with the aid of Jeremiah Mason,
Jeremiah Smith, Timothy Farrar, and Joseph Hopkinson, as well
as Justices Marshall, Washington, Story, and Supreme Court re-
porter Henry Wheaton, agreed to have the Supreme Court's opin-
ions published in book form. Early in March 1819, Webster fur-
nished Story with some of the details of publication:
One of the things I wish to see you most about relates to our
College book. Arrangements are made to print it in Exeter.
Judge Smith will see to the N-I. case; the proofs of the opinions
of the Judges will be sent to you, & of the rest of the Washing-
ton case probably to me. At any rate you are to see the proofs of
78 See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
79 See Letter from Cyrus Perkins to William Allen, Feb. 11, 1819, in Dartmouth
College Library, MS. 819,161; Letter from Daniel Webster to Francis Brown, Feb. 23,
1819, ia 1 PRIVATE ComamtsPoNDBNcE, supra note 25, at 302; Letter from Daniel
Webster to Jeremiah Mason, Feb. 24, 1819, in LETrERS, supra note 27, at 78.
80 Letter from Daniel Webster to Timothy Farrar, Feb. 9, 1819, in 29 REGISrE,
supra note 77, at 230.
Stletter from Daniel Webster to Francis Brown, Feb. 23, 1819, in 1 PRivATE
COluStPONDECEc, supra note 25, at 302.
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the Opinions. Lest the book should not get on fast enough for
Wheaton, I intend to have the opinions copied .. .I wish to go
over the Chief's & Judge W's with you, & to see that every word
& letter be right. On this account I wish to see you for two hours
soon.
82
Less than a month later, Webster changed his mind about the
Dartmouth book. His reason was probably motivated by pride. "I
shall strut well enough in the Washington Report," he informed
Jeremiah Mason, "& if the 'Book' should not be published, the world
would not know where I borrowed my plumes 2"3 Nonetheless,
he was willing to go along with Judge Story's request that the
work be published. Story believed the book would be quite useful
in convincing New Hampshire citizens of the rightness of the Su-
preme Court's decision. The only other sources of information
were the newspapers and oral transmission, neither of which could
be trusted. Therefore, Story reasoned that a book on the develop-
ment of the case "might be read by other Classes."'
While the friends of the college eagerly sought to find an edi-
tor capable of putting the Dartmouth book into shape, the time for
the May term in Portsmouth drew near. Webster and Story became
singularly familiar with each other. According to Webster they
actually discussed how the cases would be presented and what course
of action should be taken. 5 Glimpses of the behind the scene
maneuvering of these two men may be found in several of Web-
ster's private letters. On April 10 he was of the opinion that Story
wanted to settle the controversy as soon as possible and hence would
not grant a delay in the proceedings. Two days later he visited
Story at his home in Salem and reported this conversation to his
colleague Jeremiah Mason:
I flatter myself the judge will tell the defendants, that the new
facts which they talk of, were presented to the minds of the judges
at 'Washington, and that, if all proved, they would not have the
least effect on the opinion of any judge; that unless it can be
proved that the king did not grant such a charter as the special
8 2 Letter from Daniel Webster to Joseph Story, March, 1819, in 14 PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 74, at 401.
83 Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason, April 10, 1819, in LETTERS,
supra note 27, at 80. Up until March 22, 1819, Webster had been in favor of pub-
lishing the book. See Letter from Daniel Webster to Joseph Hopkinson, March 22,
1819, in 16 WRITINGS, supra note 31, at 46; Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah
Mason, March 22, 1819, in id. at 47.
84 Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason, April 10, 1819, in LETTERS,
supra note 27, at 81.
85 Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason, April 13, 1819, in 16 WRIT-
INGS, supra note 31, at 49.
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verdict recites, or that the New Hampshire General Court did
nor pass such acts as are therein contained, no material alteration
of the case can be made.8 6
Finally on May 27, 1819, counsel for the university made one
last stand to save the school. They presented to Judge Story a
"mass of papers" citing new facts in the case. Attorney John Aus-
tin read portions of his brief to the Judge in the hope he might per-
suade him to reconsider. But the university despaired when Story
challenged Austin, intimating "that the new facts had no bearing
on any part of the Court's Opinion.""7  To keep everything above
board, Story agreed to examine the papers for a few days before
rendering an opinion. But he told Webster in private that he saw
nothing which refuted or contradicted "any of these facts and the
recitals of the charter."8 8  On June 10, 1819, at the circuit court
in Portsmouth, Judge Story dealt the final blow to the university.
He ruled that no new facts had been introduced: the Dartmouth
College decision stood as valid constitutional law.
Story was not content merely to uphold the Dartmouth case
and to collaborate on a work propagandizing the Court's position.
His primary objective was to place the private corporate charter be-
yond any future State interference. To accomplish this end he ad-
vised Webster to visit Chancellor Kent and to suggest that Kent
write a review of the "Dartmouth Question."8 9  Kent refused this
request. He did so not because he disagreed with Story's constitu-
tional doctrines, 'but because a similar case was being heard in the
New York Court of Errors. Kent believed he could give more
effective recognition to the Supreme Court's decision in his court
than he could in a separate work. 0
From an ethical point of view the Dartmouth decision cannot
command great respect today. 1 The case was replete with collu-
86 Id.
87 Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason, May 27, 1819, in id. at 53.
8 8 Letter from Daniel Webster to Francis Brown, May 30, 1819, in 1 PRIVATE
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 25, at 306.
8 9 
etter from James Kent to Joseph Story, Aug. 3, 1819, in 14 PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 74, at 413. See also J. HORTON, JAMES KENT, A STUDY IN CONSERVA-
TISM 1763-1847 (1939).
9 0 See Letter from Joseph Story to Chancellor Kent, Aug. 21, 1819, in 1 STORY,
supra note 44, at 331.
9 1 See generally 1 C. HAINES, supra note 71, at 412-13. Gerald T. Dunne main-
tains that Justice Story was very much concerned about several types of private corpora-
tions, particularly the Merchants' Bank of Salem, of which he was a director. Dunne
concludes that Story feared governmental control and that this influenced his decision.
See Dunne, Joseph Story: The Great Term, 79 HARv. L. REV. 877, 910 (1966).
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sive activity between bench and bar; the legal legerdemain of Web-
ster and Story reached scandalous proportions. It was one thing
for a judge to interpret the Constitution as he viewed it from his
lofty pedestal; it was quite another thing for the judge to step down
and enter the political arena by assuming the role of a judicial leg-
islator. Story, of course, was never conscious of any wrongdoing.
The stakes were too high for him to be willing to allow unchecked
popular opinion to determine the nature of charters and contractual
obligations. In a letter to Chancellor Kent, Story described in de-
tail his reasons for desiring the decision to be placed on a broad
footing:
My wish was that you should review it, not for the purpose of
commending the Court or counsel, but from a higher motive, to
lay before the public in a popular shape, the vital importance to
the well being of society, and the security of private rights, of the
principles on which that decision rested. Unless I am very much
mistaken, these principles will be found to apply with an exten-
sive reach to all the great concerns of the people, and will check
any undue encroachments upon civil rights, which the passions or
the popular doctrines of the day may stimulate our State Legisla-
tures to adopt.92
It was a dangerous business for any member of the Supreme Court
to become so entangled in a judicial decision, for such action en-
couraged a disregard of the constitutional system of checks and
balances. The Dartmouth College case was written in 1819 at the
height of the Marshall-Story Era of constitutional lawmaking;
within a few short years the Gitterddimmerung would begin.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
CASE ON CONTRACT LAW
The impact of the Dartmouth College case was not felt imme-
diately. In time, however, the decision was incorporated into the
struggle between those favoring the growth of public corporations
and those seeking the protection of corporate rights at the State
level. The decision had the effect of giving carte blanche to private
corporations to act as they pleased, relatively free from legislative
interference. This was tempered, however, when the States were
able to provide a clause in corporate charters reserving the right
92 Letter from Joseph Story to Chancellor Kent, Aug. 21, 1819, in 1 STORY, supra
note 44, at 331. See generally Cassoday, James Kent and Joseph Story, 12 YALE L.J.
146 (1903); Haines, Political Theories of the Supreme Court from 1789-1835, 2 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 221 (1908); Latham, The Supreme Court as a Political Institution, 31
MINN. L. REV. 205 (1947).
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to alter, amend, or abolish a charter. Two further consequences
flowed from the decision. On the one hand, the battle was waged
into the late 19th and early 20th centuries over the question of
whether corporations should be left largely unregulated (private
power theory). This received considerable support from the Court.
At the turn of the century the doctrine of natural rights was resur-
rected and used to justify corporate monopolies.9"
On the other hand, the concept of public corporate growth be-
ing held in check by popular State legislatures (public power
theory) was given a helping hand by conscientious reformers, and
the decisions of Justices Marshall and Story were unable to prevent
this. In his day, Marshall was not prepared to hold that the States
were incapable of regulating all of their internal affairs (for exam-
ple, civil institutions); and hence he left open the question of the
State police power. And while Story was in basic disagreement
with Marshall there was little he could do. In Gibbons v. Ogden"
Marshall advised the nation that "Ethe acknowledged power of
a state to regulate its police, its domestic trade, and to govern its
own citizens may enable it to legislate on this subject, [commercel
to a considerable extent. . . ."I' Story, in his zeal to free municipal
corporations from public control, where private property was con-
cerned, was opposed to any development of the police power doc-
trine. It was the duty of the judiciary, he felt, to safeguard prop-
erty rights and any encouragement of residual police power might
interfere with this end.
Story was far in advance of the legal thinkers of his day. He
was fully aware of the reform movement sweeping British and con-
tinental politics and he was determined to prevent hasty, ill-advised,
popular legislation from polluting the atmosphere of the world he
respected. The closing words of his Dartmouth opinion were pro-
phetic of the ensuing conflict over popular government exemplified
in Jacksonian democracy:
In pronouncing this judgment, it has not for one moment escaped
me how delicate, difficult, and ungracious is the task devolved
upon us. The predicament in which this court stands in relation
to the nation at large is full of perplexities and embarrassments.
It is called to decide on causes between citizens of different states,
between a state and its citizens, and between different states. It
93 For a very able discussion of the results of the Dartmouth College case, see E.
COWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION 167-72 (1919).
94 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
05ld. at 208.
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stands, therefore, in the midst of jealousies and rivalries of con-
flicting parties, with the most momentous interests confided to its
care.98
The Dartmouth case provided a logical link in the long line of
decisions expanding the contract clause. In 1823, Justice Wash-
ington held in Green v. Biddle9T that an interstate political agree-
ment between Kentucky and Virginia was valid and within the
scope of the clause. When Kentucky split off from Virginia and
became a separate State, agreements were made whereby the for-
mer would recognize the legitimacy of certain Virginia land titles.
Due, however, to speculation the titles became unclear and endless
litigation in the State courts resulted. To rectify this situation,
Kentucky enacted a law which provided that no claimant should
be awarded the land unless he met certain requirements, including
compensation to the party in possession if any improvements had
been made. Such action, it was charged, altered the original agree-
ment.
Justice Bushrod Washington was of the opinion that the con-
tract clause necessarily included contracts between individuals and
the State as well as between private citizens. To the objection
raised that congressional approval of interstate compacts was a pre-
requisite (and absent in this case), Washington replied that accept-
ance on the part of Congress was implied when Kentucky became
a bona fide State."8
Once again Story could not resist writing a concurring opinion
emphasizing the rights of private property holders. Tide to land,
he insisted, could not be acquired by unilateral agreement.
Titles to land cannot be acquired or transferred in any other mode
than that prescribed by the laws of the territory where it is situate.
Every government has, and from the nature of sovereignty must
have, the exclusive right of regulating the descent, distribution and
grants of the domain within its own boundaries; and this right
must remain until it yields it up by compact or conquest.99
He rejected the argument that the Kentucky legislature had merely
changed the remedy - a justifiable police power.
It is no answer, that the acts of Kentucky, now in question, are
regulations of the remedy, and not of the right to lands. If those
acts so change the nature and extent of existing remedies, as ma-
96 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 712-13 (concurring opinion).
97 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
981d. at 86-87.
99 Id. at 12.
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terially to impair the rights and interests of the owner, they are
just as much a violation of the compact, as if they directly over-
turned his rights and interests.10 0
This time Story was less cautious than he had been 4 years earlier.
While Washington stressed the contract aspect of the interstate
compact, Story urged an appeal to natural rights of property, plac-
ing little or no emphasis on constitutional provisions. The case
was interesting from still another angle. Justices Todd and Living-
ston were ill and did not participate; Marshall refused to sit; and
William Johnson dissented. The majority, consisting of Story,
Washington, and Duval, hardly represented a majority of the
Court. 0
1
Green v. Biddle constituted one of five blows that the Supreme
Court struck at Kentucky between 1821 and 1825. Federal ad-
miralty jurisdiction was extended over Kentucky's inland waters; a
Kentucky law which protected settlers who had made improve-
ments on disputed patents was voided; Kentucky legislation pro-
tecting judgment debtors was ignored in favor of creditors; and the
Bank of the United States was sustained over State banks. It was
small wonder that the decision was severely criticized and that the
clamor for reform of the federal judiciary increased steadily.' The
upshot of Gree v. Biddle was, however, anticlimactic. Kentucky
refused to be bound by the decision and it was enforceable only in
lower federal courts. In this instance, Story was not very successful
in asserting the supremacy of federal law.
The drift toward a federal concept of the contract clause con-
tinued in several different forms. For one thing, the doctrine of
the impairment of contractual obligations was extended to State
bankruptcy laws. In Sturges v. Crowninshield03 a New York in-
solvency law was held to be invalid since it attempted to discharge
a contract or debt entered into prior to the passage of the law. The
motive behind the Court's decision was to push Congress gently
into passing a national bankruptcy law. Marshall, in speaking for
the majority, did not deny that in the absence of congressional legis-
100 Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
101 See generally D. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAm JOHNSON, THE FrsT DIS-
SNTR 214-15 (1954); Levin, Mr. Jastice William Johnson and the Unenviable Di-
lemma, 42 Mic. L. REv. 803-30 (1944); Levin, Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative
Dissenter, 43 MCIL L. REV. 497 (1944); Morgan, Mr. Justice William Johnson and
the Constitution, 57 I-ARv. L REv. 328 (1944).
102 See A. MAsoN & W. BEANEY, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE SOCIETY
202-03 (1959).
103 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
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lation States could enact bankruptcy statutes, but he held that they
were subject to federal preemption.14
The ratio of Sturges was based solely on the fact that the debts
involved were incurred before the insolvency act was passed. The
State of New York circumvented this obstacle by passing a new
bankruptcy law (discharging the future acquisition of debts). The
Supreme Court in a divided opinion in Ogdens v. Saunders,' held
that the new State act did not violate constitutional mandates, since
the contracts were entered into after passage of the insolvency
legislation. Marshall and Story dissented and refused to accept the
decision as ruling law. By the end of the Marshall-Story Era the
majority of the Court had retreated from the absolute approach
regarding the sanctity of bankruptcy contracts. Neither the Chief
Justice nor his faithful aide-de-camp were able to convince their
brethren that such a doctrine was dangerous to civil society.'
V. THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE
It has often been said that the death of John Marshall marked
the end of national supremacy and that the accession of Roger B.
Taney to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court her-
alded an era of State sovereignty. Such statements are quite in-
accurate appraisals of the changes which took place from 1830-45
on the Court. However, lest one assume that the Taney Court
was but a continuation of Marshall's nationalism, it should be
pointed out that there were some significant departures. For one
thing, the personnel of the bench underwent a transformation in
this period. After 1835, for instance, there were only two hold-
overs from the Marshall Court - Story and Thompson. The
majority of the appointments to the bench during the Jacksonian
Period were classified as "agrarian Democrats" with perhaps two
notable exceptions - John McLean and James Wayne. 7
The philosophy of nationalism, the protection of corporate
rights, and the inviolability of contract at the expense of State soy-
104 Id. at 208. See generally A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CON-
STITUTION 281 (3d ed. 1963).
105 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
10 6 See generally B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRAcT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
27-91 (1938); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARV. L REV.
621, 654-63 (1944).
107 The Justices of the Supreme Court included Joseph Story (Madison); Smith
Thompson (Monroe); John McLean (Jackson); Henry Baldwin (Jackson); James
Wayne (Jackson); Roger B. Taney (Jackson); and Philip Barbour (Jackson).
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ereignty which Story had professed a decade earlier ran into stiff
resistance from a Court more conscious of the rights of popular
majorities and more in sympathy with doctrines of State sover-
eignty. Dual federalism is the phrase that best describes the Taney
rule.0 8 Therefore, it is not surprising that Story was out of place
on the Taney Court. He repudiated such doctrines, becoming more
conservative as he fought battle after batte with the new Justices.
Taney's concept of the public interest differed sharply from
that of Marshall and Story. With the growth of State and local
government, as well as the increasing complexity of corporations,
there was a widespread need for various types of State regulation.
The Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge"°9 case best exemplifies
the subtle changes occurring in constitutional theory during this
period.
It took 6 years to get an answer from the Court on the Charles
River Bridge lawsuit. Justice Story called Professor John Ash-
mun's attention to the litigation as early as February 1831. The
case, he found, had heavy overtones of influence peddling by Mas-
sachusetts politicians.
We are not yet at the Charlestown Bridge cause, though it has
been staring us in the face for a week past. I think it will be
reached next week, & then comes the tug of war. We have al-
ready a deputation from Charlestown to take care of the Court
& report progress, and the address of Mr. Morton's [Marcus Mor-
ton, one of the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts] constituents has taken some pains to prevent our falling
into great errors without all proper admonitions. I want no bet-
ter gauge of the man than that as a Judge he is willing to be the
candidate of such people with such avowed opinions.1 0
The Bridge case was argued the week of March 7-11, 1831, but
Marshall apparently elected to avoid the issue during the term by
10 8 See generally W. LEWIS, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: A BIOGRAPHY OF CHIEF
JusTzcE ROGER BROOKE TANEY (1965); B. PALMER, MARSHALL AND TANEY:
STATESMAN OF THE LAw (1966); C. SMITH, JR., ROGER B. TANEY: JACKSONIAN
JnusRT (1936); B. STEINER, IuFE OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY (1922); C. SWISHER,
ROGER B. TANEY (1922); S. TYLER, MEMOIR OF ROGER BROOKE TANIY (1872);
G. VAN DEusEN, TrE JACKSONIAN ERA 1828-1848 (1959); Harris, Chief Justice
Taney, Prophet of Reform and Reaction, 10 VAND. L REV. 227 (1957); Mallison,
The Political Theories of Roger B. Taney, 1 SO. WEsT. POL. SC. Q. 219 (1920);
McKinley, The Taney Bench, 16 GREEN BAG 369 (1904); Ransom, Roger B. Taney:
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (1836-1864), 24 GEO. L.J.
809 (1936).
109 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). For a discussion concerning the facts of this
case, see text accompanying notes 114-15 infra.
110 Letter from Joseph Story to John H. Ashmun, Feb. 24, 1831, in 14 PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 74, at 217.
19681
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:493
not handing down a decision. Justice Story had already made up
his mind (long before the case was argued) that charters and con-
tracts of private corporations were sacrosanct. He proceeded to
prepare his opinion, which he finished 2 days before Christmas.
Story apologized to Jeremiah Mason for the length of his draft, but
his purpose, he said, was to convince those of his brethren who
had some doubts on the constitutional questions."' He hoped it
might be possible "to gain allies" by presenting an early opinion.
This was a favorite maneuver of Story. By working up an elab-
orate opinion studded with authorities he would attempt to overawe
his brothers and convince them of the rectitude of his position.
This tactic was highly effective and successful in the early Marshall
period; but as the Court began to change personnel, new men ap-
peared on the bench who could articulate their own political and
social philosophies and they were often in direct conflict with the
ideas of Joseph Story."'
When the Court convened in 1832 the case was reargued, and
because the five judges in attendance were divided in opinion the
cause was ordered to be continued. Justices Marshall, Story, and
Thompson, a familiar triumvirate, were in favor of voiding the de-
cision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court which had up-
held the chartering of a second bridge company. McLean ques-
tioned the Court's jurisdiction; Baldwin was on record as opposed,
and Johnson and Duval were absent. Without unanimity on the
bench, Marshall was unwilling to risk further rupture. The case
was put off indefinitely and did not finally come up for disposition
until 1837."l
In 1650 the Massachusetts Legislature granted Harvard College
the right to establish a ferry service from Charlestown to Boston." 4
In 1785 the legislature incorporated a company to build a bridge
and to indemnify Harvard for the title. The bridge began service
in 1786; in 1792 its charter was extended for 70 years and at the
expiration of this period title was to vest in the Commonwealth.
The Massachusetts Legislature decided in 1828 to incorporate a
second company, the object of which was to erect a bridge close
by the first structure. Before construction was completed an in-
Ill See Letter from Joseph Story to Jeremiah Mason, Nov. 18, 1831, in J. MASON,
MEMOIR AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JEREMIAH MASON 334 (1873).
112 See Letter from Joseph Story to Jeremiah Mason, Dec. 23, 1831, in id. at 337.
113 See Letter from Joseph Story to John H. Ashmun, March 1, 1832, in 2 STORY,
supra note 44, at 91.
114 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 426 (1837).
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junction was obtained against the new Warren Bridge Company.
It was alleged that the legislation impaired the contractual rights
of private corporations. The United States Supreme Court granted
a writ of error after the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
had ruled in favor of the Warren Bridge Company."'
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney in his maiden opinion spoke for
the majority, and at the outset let it be known he was no devotee
of the Marshall-Story school. The argument of vested rights was
dismissed as not in point. The grant was by the public to a private
corporation; the matter was one of great public concern. Such
contractual arrangements were always public and subject to State
regulation. Taney indicated that English precedent as well as sev-
eral cases in American law supported his stand. But the substance
of his decision revolved around his political philosophy. The the-
ory of public interest meant that the community as a whole was to
benefit from the services of a corporation created by the State. Any
diminution of the State's police power to regulate corporations
would emasculate good government. "The continued existence of
a government would be of no great value, if by implications and
presumptions, it was disarmed of the powers necessary to accom-
plish the ends of -its creation; and the functions it was designed to
perform, transferred to the hands of privileged corporations."
'
"
In short, no charter or contract was involved in the decision.
Justice McLean disagreed with Taney. He took the position
that the legislation in question attempted to regulate a contract -
a substantive right in law."7 But he raised a doubt that the judi-
ciary should interfere with legislative matters. If Massachusetts
elected to have two bridges, side by side, was it any concern of the
Supreme Court? Nothing could be found in the Constitution
forcing States to create a single bridge. He disagreed, however,
that any monopoly was present, thereby reserving the query whether
the federal government could allow State monopolies of public con-
veniences. McLean was skeptical of the doctrine of the immunity
of vested rights; with the growth of city government, individual
landowners daily faced the threat of eminent domain. No one dis-
puted that property owners were provided with certain privileged
rights; yet all were agreed that such rights were relative, not ab-
115 Story thought that the case presented "a glorious argument on all sides, strong
and powerful ...." Letter from Joseph Story to William W. Story, Jan. 28, 1837, in
Massachusetts Historical Society, Story MS. 47.
11636 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 548.
117 Id. at 554 (concurring opinion).
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solute. In the final analysis McLean felt the Court lacked juris-
diction, the case being one of local concern and not involving con-
stitutional adjudication. He, therefore, was in favor of dismissing
the entire proceedings." 8
The proponents of Jacksonian democracy on the Taney Court
were unable to silence the ailing and somewhat crotchety Justice
Story. Speaking for himself and Justice Thompson, he delivered a
scathing indictment as he dissented from the majority. The sole
issue he contended was the obligation of contract, but others had
seen fit to indulge themselves in idle speculation." 9 The opinion
by Story in the Charles River Bridge case was far from his best. It
retraced the enigmas of the English common law on charters, royal
grants, corporations, monopolies, and franchises. As Story said, it
was an appeal to the past:
I stand upon the old law; upon law established more than three
centuries ago, in cases contested with as much ability and learning,
as any in the annals of our jurisprudence, in resisting any such
encroachments upon the rights and liberties of the citizens, se-
cured by public grants. I will not consent to shake their title
deeds, by any speculative niceties or novelties.120
He charged that Taney was inaccurate in describing the case to
be one of a royal grant and hence revokable at the will of the leg-
islature. It was a legislative grant subject under the Dartmouth
College rule to judicial review.'' Story was absolutely correct on
this ground. When he discussed whether the legislature could alter
or modify private contractual rights, however, (which, of course,
he denied could be done) he was back again to his original constitu-
tional construction. Here he was obviously treading on thin ice
since the Court had decided to supersede its earlier position and re-
state the concept of State police power in the area of public and
private enterprise. 22
Story took issue with the majority's concept of public interest.
If private capital (what he was actually talking about was private
monopoly, although he denied this) was uncertain in its commer-
cial transactions due to fear of undue competition, its confidence
would be shaken, which in turn would lead to economic panic. If
government invited the people to share in bridge building, there
118 d. at 583.
119 See id. at 586 (Story, J., dissenting).
12 01d. at 598.
121 See id. at 645.
122 See B. WRIGHT, supra note 106, at 168-78.
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had to be a correlative duty to safeguard private property. This
protection lay in judicial review of State legislative acts.'23 The
weakest part of Story's argument was his fruitless search into the
archaic common law for precedents to support his supposition that
franchises, like charters and contracts, were meant to be covered by-
the Constitution; that they were free from State regulation and that
this construction constituted the best interests of the people. He
distinguished between a monopoly ("an exclusive right granted to
a few, of something which was before of common right") 2 and a
franchise ("the right to grant exclusive privileges for public ser-
vices, without ascertaining of what nature those services may be").2 5
The latter was not a monopoly since "[ilt took from no citizen what
he possessed before; and had no tendency to take it from him."' 26
Finally Story attempted to salvage his already poorly stated
opinion by making two concise appeals. The first plea was for a
return to the principles of natural justice which the earlier Mar-
shall Court had enunciated in shaping the ends of central govern-
ment."'27 The second petition requested the Court to redefine the
nature of public and private grants; the former, he alleged, were
for the benefit of the people and of necessity were restricted; the
latter were in favor of private enterprise and free from State gov-
ernmental interference. The root of the problem was in reality,
however, the concept of sovereignty - a term which is composed
of various shadings of meaning and interpretation. No matter how
free governments (referring to State governmental units) may ex-
tol the blessings of sovereignty "they are universally held to be re-
strained within some limits."" '  The Massachusetts Legislature was
"in no just sense sovereign."'29  It was merely the fiduciary agent
of the State and could not transcend constitutional boundaries.
What Story failed to add was that the legislature could not exceed
constitutional dictates of the Supreme Court as interpreted by the
individual Justices in a final arbitrating capacity.
Thus, Story's dissent in the Charles River Bridge case was a
123 36 U.S. (11 Pet) at 603.
124 Id. at 607.
125 Id. at 606.
121 Id. at 607.
127 r'The reason is plain. The prohibition arises by natural, if not by necessary im-
plication. It would be against the first prindples of justice to presume that the legis-
lature reserved a right'to destroy its own grant" Id. at 616-17.
128 Id, at 642.
129 Id. at 643.
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last-ditch stand by the Whig nationalists to halt the flow of a more
liberal constitutional philosophy - a philosophy, it might be added,
which had already permeated the minds of the majority of the
bench.' Story was visibly shaken when longtime admirers, such
as Charles Sumner, refused to accept his opinion.'' Only the hard
core nationalists such as Webster and Kent, stood behind Story,
clinging to the ideas of days gone past. 3 ' Chancellor Kent felt
the millennium had arrived. The Charles River Bridge case had,
as he put it, overthrown "a great principle of constitutional Mor-
ality" and threatened to destroy "the Security and Value of legisla-
tive Franchises." He wrote in a similarly vitriolic vein:
It injures the moral Sense of the Community & destroys the
Sanctity of Contracts. If the Legislature can quibble away or whit-
tle away its contracts with Impunity, the People will be sure to
follow - Quidquid delirant reges plectunter Achivi - I abhor
the Doctrine that the Legislature is not bound by any thing that is
necessarily implied in a Contract in order to give it Effect & value,
& by nothing that is not expressed in hoc verba.... Now we
sadly realize that we are to be under the reign of little Men - a
pigmy race & that the Sages of the last age are extinguished. 33
What was Story's reaction to the case? He continued to press
the opinion that the ablest lawyers in the country were opposed
to the decision; but it was merely wishful thinking on his part. He
shared Chancellor Kent's fears that "the old constitutional" doc-
trines were fading away and that the day was gone when "a law of
a State or of Congress will -be declared unconstitutional." Without
the power of judicial review the Court's work would be merely ad-
visory; if this happened there would no longer be any agency re-
sponsible for protection of vested interests. "A change has come
over the public mind," he wrote to Justice McLean, "from which I
augur little good."' 4  In fact, Story became so despondent that he
considered retiring, but at the urging of his friends he opted to re-
130 See A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 104, at 346.
131 Letter from Charles Sumner to Joseph Story, March 25, 1837, in 15 PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 74, at 211.
132 "The Charles River Bridge case is decided, and the opinion will be delivered
to-day. Mr. Greenleaf has gained the cause, and I am sorry for it.... A case of grosser
injustice, or more oppressive legislation, never existed. I feel humiliated, as I think
every one here is, by the Act which has now been confirmed." Letter from Joseph
Story to Sarah Story, Feb. 14, 1837, in 2 STORY, supra note 44, at 268.
133 Letter from Chancellor Kent to Joseph Story, June 23, 1837, in Massachusetts
Historical Society, Story MS. 30.
134 Letter from Joseph Story to John McLean, May 10, 1837, in 2 STORY, supra
note 44, at 272.
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main on the bench; he was half-hopeful that he might curb further
invasions of cherished private rights."5
In later years the Supreme Court continuously narrowed the
artificial line that Story had drawn between public and private prop-
erty and contractual rights of corporations. In Munn v. Illinois3 .
the Court held that it was an accepted historical fact that legislatures
possessed the authority to regulate private property for the public
welfare. State legislatures scrupulously avoided the Dartmouth
College case. Instead they altered their corporate charters by re-
serving the power to amend, and this action was upheld as a public
contract by the courts.'37
The Supreme Court distinguished in Stone v. Mississippi3 ' con-
tracts constitutionally protected (those relating to property rights)
from those not covered (governmental or public). Public corpora-
tions, it was said, are creatures of the State which organized them,
and they can be revoked by the will of the legislature. Such con-
tractual arrangements it was announced are mere privileges and not
rights. 39
VI. CONCLUSION
Read together, the Dartmouth College case and the Charles
River Bridge case were actually in conflict. The Bridge opinion
did not declare that a charter was not a contract; but it limited the
contract to the "actual provisions of the charter."'"4 The result was
a definite victory for the States' righters over the nationalists. It
created a balance between the theory of vested rights and public
interests.' Today, a public corporation rarely relies on charter
privileges or other special favors granted to it by the State legisla-
ture in order to resist regulation. The development of the police
power was built upon the political conservatism of the Marshall-
Story Era. The heavy hand of Marshall and Story as expressed in
135 See Letter from Joseph Story to Richard Peters, June 14, 1837, in id. at 274.
13694 U.S. 113 (1876).
137 See, e.g., Looker v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46 (1900).
138 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
23 9 See id. The constitutional prohibition upon States not to impair obligation of
contract does not prevent States from protecting health, morals, public safety, or rights
and privileges arising out of such contracts. New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light
Co., 114 U.S. 650 (1885).
140 A. MASON & W. BEANEY, supra note 102, at 203.
141 See Schubert, The Theory of the Public Interest in Judicial Decision-Making,
2 MDWEST J. POL. Sc. 1 (1958).
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the Dartmouth case and others, however, continued to plague the
Court in its changing economic, social, and political role.42
The Supreme Court remained far from liberal, however, in its
interpretation of State legislation which attempted to regulate con-
tractual rights between private individuals. In the 1840's, State
laws allowing retrospective relief to judgment creditors were de-
clared to be unconstitutional as violative of the familiar article I,
section 10 of the Constitution."' Such decisions had the blessing
of Justice Story. Later in the century the Court would use the
same arguments of classical economics to write the concept of sub-
stantive due process into the 14th amendment and to free the
States from federal regulation.
The same conservative economic philosophy spilled over into
the 20th century. It was not until 1934, 115 years after the fa-
mous Marshall-Story decisions upon contractual sanctity, that the
Supreme Court was forced to review the earlier opinions of Dart-
mouth College and Sturges v. Crowninshield. The depression had
created the need for State assistance to farmers who were deeply
in debt. The State of Minnesota passed a moratorium on mort-
gage foreclosures. In Home Building and Loan Association v.
Blaisdell,144 a 5-4 test case, Chief Justice Hughes reversed the long
trend of cases upholding laissez faire government. Hughes found
no impairment of the obligation of contract, distinguishing as had
many learned lawyers a century before between contract and rem-
edy. Hughes in effect repudiated nearly all of Story's work on the
contract clause. He recognized the extent and the importance of
the police power:
It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended
a century ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Consti-
tution meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision
of our time.
... With a growing recognition of public needs and the rela-
tion of individual right to public security, the court has sought to
prevent the perversion of the clause through its use as an instru-
142 The following works should be consulted on the development of the police
power doctrine. E. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS
(1948); R. HARIUS, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (1940); C. READ,
THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED (1938); R. ROETTINGER, THE SUPREME COURT
AND STATE POLICE POWER (1957); H. ROTTsCHAEFER, THE CONSTITUTION AND
SocIo-EcONoMIc CHANGE (1948).
14 In particular, see Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 310 (1843). See also
A. KELLEY & W. HARBISON, supra note 104, at 509-20.
144 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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ment to throttle the capacity of the States to protect their funda-
mental interests.1 45
There were four members of the bench, however, who reflected
the Story attitude of an unqualified restriction on State legislative
activity. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the minority, revived the
Dartmouth ratio, citing the historical necessity of absolute contracts
and the fear of the destruction of vested rights.14 But in a period
of economic crisis neither the majority of the Court nor the nation
was willing to listen to the timeworn arguments of the Storys and
the Sutherlands. The time was ripe for constitutional change.
The concept of a public interest which aided the few was finally
discarded for a theory which provided aid for the many. For all
intents and purposes, Story's doctrine of the obligation of private
contracts has died a natural and long overdue death. The distinc-
tion between private and public contracts, as well as corporations,
has been well defined by the courts.'47 Nevertheless, the impact
of Story's constitutional philosophy, at least, in this area was sig-
nificant. The Court tenaciously held to many of his ideas until the
demands of the day forced even the most conservative of the jus-
tices to alter their theories of the public interest. Fortunately the
grip of Mr. Justice Story on contract law has finally slipped into
constitutional history.
145 Id. at 442.44.
146 Id. at 448 (dissenting opinion). Two recent cases indicate that the Court has not
reached a consensus on the concept of the public interest. "Since Flktcher v. Peck ...
was decided many years ago, it has repeatedly been pointed out that it is not the business
of the federal courts to inquire into the personal motives of legislators." Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 337 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting); cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960), where the Supreme Court ruled that it could inquire into mu-
nicipal redistricting in which citizens might "suffer serious economic disadvantages."
Id. at 343.
'47 Courts generally distinguish between vested rights and remedies. In Empire
State Ins. Co. v. Chafety, 302 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1962), an'insurer was held obligated
by State law. The court stated that "no state statute may be enacted which impairs the
obligation of a contract is axiomatic... But this proscription applies to substantive
rights as distinguished from mere procedural remedies." Id. at 831.
19681
